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Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ.9 deals with the controversial topic of the object 
of his God’s νόησις. It is the purpose of this paper to discover exactly what 
this νοητόν is. In Section I, I catalogue existing interpretations and also state 
how the two key concepts for understanding the νοητόν are (i) God’s 
substancehood and (ii) his metaphysical simplicity. In Section II, I work out 
the first two aporiae of Λ.9, namely (1) ‘How must God be if he is to be most 
divine?’ – laying out the three options presented, of God’s οὐσία being (a) 
potentially, but not actually thinking, (b) actually thinking, but determined to 
do so by something else, and (c) actually thinking, and determined to do so 
by itself – and (2) ‘What does God intelligize?’ – again laying out the three 
options of God’s νοητόν being (I) himself, or (II) something else, specifically, 
(II.i) always the same thing (but not God) or (II.ii) a (n unrestricted) number 
of different things (none of which are God), which God switches between 
intelligizing. In Section III, I show how Aristotle solves these aporiae by 
contending that God’s οὐσία is (c) and the object of his νόησις is (I), such 
that he intelligizes his own οὐσία, and I explain what this means. In Section 
IV, I present the second pair of aporiae – namely, (3) ‘Is it possible for God 
to intelligize himself directly?’ and (4) ‘Where does the good belong in this 
case?’ – and show how, by solving these, Aristotle clarifies the position 
arrived at in Section III. In Section V, I present the final aporia – ‘Can God 
himself be composite (as τὸ νοούμενον)?’ – and its solution, and conclude 
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that Aristotle’s God is a radically-unified Narcissus-God who intelligizes his 
own οὐσία and who has, above all, fulfilled the Delphic principle: Γνῶθι 
Σεαυτόν. 
 
 
1 
 
Before working through the text of Metaphysics Λ.9, it is important to 
begin by cataloguing previous interpretations of the object of Aristotle’s 
Prime-Mover God’s 1  νόησις and pointing out two important concepts 
required for understanding just what this object is. Traditionally, the object of 
God’s νόησις is just himself. 2  This ‘Narcissus-God’ interpretation 3  is 
frequently characterized by a reliance on the following ‘Syllogistic Proof’: [1] 
God intelligizes4 (necessarily and exclusively)5 what is best; [2] God is best; 
therefore, [3] God intelligizes himself.6 Both Brunschwig7 – though only for 
Λ.9, and not Λ.7 – and Menn8 advance this view. Alternatively, Norman 
suggests that God’s νόησις, being the same as our ‘abstract thought,’ takes an 
unspecified ‘perfection [τὸ τιμιώτατον],’ which does not result in ‘self-
contemplation,’ as its object.9 De Filippo suggests that, because God is pure 
                                          
1 It is controversial to call Aristotle’s Prime-Mover ‘God.’ Some deny Aristotle’s God 
is the Unmoved Mover (e.g. Bordt (2011)). Others (e.g. Menn (2012), 423) deny 
that Aristotle has any concept of a ‘capital-G’ God. Bordt’s point is well-taken – 
essentially, God is the pure actuality of νόησις, not the Prime Mover. Yet, the 
attribute ‘Prime Mover’ may still properly be predicated of him, so while it is 
‘misleading’ to primarily characterize him thus, it is not incorrect. Against Menn, 
since the Prime Mover moves the Prime Heaven, it is the only absolutely unmoved 
celestial unmoved mover – the ‘lower’ unmoved movers being per accidens moved 
with their associated spheres within the Prime Heaven (DC I.9, 279a11-28; cf. 
Menn himself (2012), 442). This seems to warrant applying the term ‘God’ to the 
Prime Mover as a way to set him apart. 
2 Ross (1995), 114. 
3 So-called after Norman (1969), 63-64. 
4 Following Brunschwig (2000), 275 n.6, I translate the word-family as νοῦς = 
intellect; νόησις = intellection; νοεῖν, νοεῖσθαι = intelligize, to be intelligized; 
νοούμενον = what is intelligized, the intelligized object. 
5 Cf. Brunschwig (2000), 288, for these added constraints. 
6 Ross (1995), 114; Norman (1969), 63; Brunschwig (2000), 288. 
7 Brunschwig (2000), 288, 288 n.45, 299-301. 
8 Menn (2012), 444-446.  
9 Norman (1969), 67-69, 71, 73. 
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actuality, we cannot know the content of his νόησις.10 Kosman takes the 
force of Λ.9 to be the denial that God thinks in a reflexively self-conscious 
way,11 and, instead, suggests God’s eternal, intentional subjectivity is what 
remains as ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις while he intellects first one, then another, 
unspecified essence.12 Lear13 and Burnyeat14 believe that God is – and, thus, 
the object of his νόησις is – a unified system of all intelligible essences 
(Brunschwig15 also thinks this for Λ.7). Lastly, Beere, emphasizing the 
radical unity and simplicity of God, suggests that, while God intellects 
himself, this occurs in a non-relational way and, thus, resists further 
specification.16  
With the current scholarly landscape enumerated, I wish to highlight the 
two key concepts of (i) divine substancehood and (ii) divine simplicity, both 
of which are posited in the chapters leading up to, and including, Λ.9. First, 
with respect to divine substancehood, Metaphysics Λ is introduced as an 
essay about the principles of ‘substance [οὐσία]’ (Λ.1, 1069a18-19) and, 
throughout Λ.6-8, Aristotle frequently makes it clear – through the use of the 
singular or by directly mentioning the ‘prime heaven’ – that his God (and not 
just his many celestial unmoved movers) is a substance (Λ.6, 1071b4; Λ.7, 
1072a24-5, 1072a31-32, 1073a3-6; Λ.8, 1073a29-30, 1074a34-35). Similarly – 
and again using the singular to specifically denote God – God’s metaphysical 
simplicity is attested to in Λ.7, wherein he is first said to be a ‘simple [ἡ 
ἁπλῆ]’ substance (1072a31-32) and, later, to be ‘without parts and indivisible 
[ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος] (1073a6-7).’ Further, these two characteristics are 
also present in Λ.9, with God’s substancehood being thrice-affirmed at 
1074b20, 20, 22, and his metaphysical simplicity being suggested at 1075a3-5. 
Possessing this understanding of both of these points, as we shall see, is 
crucial for our investigation of the object of Aristotle’s God’s νόησις.  
 
 
2 
 
Let us now begin with Λ.9’s introduction (1074b15) and the first pair of 
                                          
10 Ross (1995), 545, 558-560. 
11 Kosman (2000), 323. 
12 Kosman (2000), 321, 323. 
13 Lear (1988), 295. 
14 Burnyeat (2008), 40-43, 40 n.53.  
15 Brunschwig (2000), 303-304. 
16 Beere (2010), 20, 26-27, 29-30. 
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aporiae. I think it is clear early on – though, contra Norman,17 not so early as 
‘τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον’18 at 1074b16 – that the chapter’s subject is 
God’s intellect (specifically its divinity and object), because of the use of the 
singular and the thrice-mentioned substancehood (οὐσία), of the intellect 
under discussion (1074b20, 20, 22). Kosman, then, is incorrect to suggest that 
the topic of this chapter is merely the difficulty of the divinity of both man 
and God’s intellects – since man’s νοῦς is not itself a substance, but only a 
faculty.19  
Now, onto the first aporia (1074b15-21). The difficulty here is expressed 
through the question: ‘How must God be – what “condition” (1074b16) must 
he be in – if he is to be most divine?’ The ‘condition’ here refers to whether 
God’s οὐσία is νόησις or νοῦς, where the two are contrasted – as throughout 
Λ.920 – as actuality (though the term ‘ἐνέργεια’ is absent from Λ.9)21 to 
δύναμις.22 While this aporia does not directly deal with the object of God’s 
νόησις, it is impossible to determine God’s νοητόν without first 
understanding what God is.23 Evidently, there are three options for God’s 
οὐσία: (a) potentially, but not actually thinking, (b) actually thinking, but 
being determined to do so by something else, and (c) actually thinking, and 
determined to do so by itself. Option (a) is immediately rejected due to the 
lack of reverence in the ‘sleeper’ case (1074b17-18), where intellection is not 
(ever) actualized, resulting in an Endymion-like state of perpetual potency (a 
                                          
17 Norman (1969), 69. 
18 Note that all Greek from Met. Λ in this article is borrowed from Alexandru’s (2014) 
critical edition of the book. 
19 Kosman (2000), 307. Cf. Beere (2010), 5 n.7, who points out that the problems Λ.9 
raises do not arise for human instances of νοῦς (e.g. being the best substance, not 
changing its object, etc.). 
20 That is, at 1074b20, 21-22, 28 – after the forgivable exception of the introductory 
instance of ‘τὸν νοῦν’ at 1074b15. 
21 Dumoulin (1988), 30-31 and Brunschwig (2000), 301 employ this absence as an 
argument for Λ.9 being a (much) earlier composition than Λ.7 (in which the term 
‘ἐνέργεια’ is present). However, Λ.9 draws unambiguous inferences from chapters 
Λ.1 and Λ.6 concerning God’s immutability and eternal intelligizing (see this 
Section and Section III (especially footnote 47), below) and both of these chapters 
also contain the term ‘ἐνέργεια,’ which appears to invalidate at least this portion of 
Dumoulin and Brunschwig’s larger arguments for the chronological relationship 
between Λ.7 and Λ.9.  
22 For examples of other instances where this contrast is made, see Met. Θ.9, 1051a30 
or DA I.3, 407a19-22.  
23 Cf. De Filippo (1995), 555. 
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life Aristotle explicitly calls not divine at EN X.8, 1178b20). Evidence is also 
given against (b) via the contention that, if something else determines God to 
intelligize, and is therefore ‘in charge of [κύριον]’ God (and his intelligizing) 
– so that he is not essentially intelligizing, but is brought to actuality by an 
external and distinct νοητόν or by some other faculty or substance (the 
phrasing is ambiguous)24 – then he would ‘not be the best substance [οὐκ ἂν 
ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία],’ contrary to what we believe about God (1074b18-20).25 We 
then learn – in what I take to be an unqualified sense, since the subject of 
‘αὐτῷ’ that is being referred to here, and repeatedly from 1074b15 to 1074b21 
(e.g. τούτου at 1074b19),26 seems to be the ‘τὸν νοῦν’ from the very first 
clause, namely the ‘intellect’ (God) which presents τινὰς ἀπορίας – that God 
has ‘honour [τὸ τίμιον]’ because of his (actual) ‘intelligizing [νοεῖν] 
(1074b20-21).’27 This suggests that (c) is the preferred case.  
Two key things to notice from this first aporia are that (i) we are starting 
from the subject-object model also present in the De Anima, and, relatedly, (ii) 
we are, throughout, holding onto the substancehood of God. That the subject-
object model is being employed is clear from the ‘determination’ language 
present in Λ.9. Thus, we should be reminded of DA III.4, where a passive 
faculty (νοῦς), which is a δύναμις capable of receiving a form, is acted upon 
by an external object of thought (the νοητόν), which causes the νοῦς to, in ‘in 
a way,’ become that νοητόν, even before actually intelligizing28 (429a10-18; 
429b5-9; 429b22-430a9). This subject-object model, involving a νοῦς 
receiving the νοητόν, is also present at Λ.7, 1072b20-21.29 The aporia, then, 
seems to arise from conceiving God’s substance as a νοῦς in a ‘naturalistic’ 
way30 – i.e. as a faculty and a passive, receptive, capacity. It seems that this 
provides another piece of evidence for accepting (c) rather than (b), though – 
                                          
24 De Filippo (1995), 553. 
25 We should recognize the limitation here: the negative conclusion – that God would 
not be the best substance – only follows because this actual intelligizing is subject 
to something else which would be κύριον over it. Thus, Brunschwig (2000), 280-
281 is correct: ‘τούτου δ’ ἄλλο κύριον’ belongs to the protasis beginning with ‘εἴτε 
νοεῖ.’  
26 With Beere (2010), 11 n.15 and contra Brunschwig (2000), 278 n.18. 
27 The colon setting this clause off by itself in Alexandru’s (2014), 107 critical edition 
of Metaphysics Λ should, therefore, be respected. 
28 Cf. Burnyeat (2008), 23-34. 
29 Cf. Beere (2010), 8. 
30 Cf. Beere (2010), 4-6, 10-13. 
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contra Norman31 – the aporia remains unsettled as of now – as evidenced by 
the ‘εἴτε . . . εἴτε’ construction at 1074b21-22.32  
 
1) 
We can now move onto the second aporia, which asks, ‘What does God 
intelligize?’ (1074b21-27). Cautiously assuming, with Brunschwig 33  and 
Ross,34 that Aristotle accepts this aporia’s premises, there appears to be an 
exclusive and exhaustive nature to the division presented, wherein the 
options for the object of God’s νόησις are: (I) himself or (II) something else 
(1074b22-23). Within option (II)35 are the further options of (II.i), where the 
object is always the same (but not God), or (II.ii), where the objects are a(n 
unrestricted) number of different things, which God intelligizes in the way of 
‘first that, and then this’ (none of them being God). 
This alternative is more significant than many commentators have realized. 
It is not just that Aristotle ‘does not conceive of any intellect able both to 
intelligize itself and something else,’36 it is that God as his own object of 
thought, (I), is presented such that he cannot be understood as just one 
possible νοητόν among νοητά.37 We know that, elsewhere, Aristotle states 
that the νοῦς and its object are the same, especially for νοητά without matter 
(Met. Λ.7, 1072b20-21; DA III.4, 429b30-430a7), when the νοῦς reaches 
second potentiality / first actuality, or is at second actuality (as a purely actual 
νόησις-God would be).38 Thus, in these cases, anything the νοῦς intelligizes 
would be able to be considered ‘itself.’ Yet, something more is clearly meant 
at Λ.9, 1074b21-23. God thinking himself is set off from all other possible 
objects, so that there must be a special, close relationship intended that would 
not hold even in those cases where νοῦς thinks theoretical objects of 
knowledge. 
Returning to the text, at 1074b23-26 Aristotle immediately calls into doubt 
– and ultimately rejects – the idea that God’s νοητόν is not of ‘the fine [τὸ 
                                          
31 Norman (1969), 69. 
32 Cf. De Filippo (1995), 554 n.16; Brunschwig (2010), 287; Beere (2010), 18. 
33 Brunschwig (2000), 282-283. 
34 Ross (1995), 114. 
35 The ‘καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι’ construction clearly sets (II.i) and (II.ii) within (II), contra 
De Koninck (1994), 472-473. 
36 Brunschwig (2000), 282. 
37 Cf. Norman (1969), 70. 
38 The identity between νοῦς and νοητόν, of course, also holds during second 
actuality.  
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καλόν],’ but rather just ‘anything [τὸ τυχόν] (1074b24),’ suggesting that this 
would be absurd.39 Instead, Aristotle affirms that God must clearly intelligize 
‘the most divine and most worthy of honour [τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον] 
(1074b26).’  
While this portion of text does not per se eliminate any of our options, it 
plays an important role in restricting what we can include within (II) and, 
also, provides some evidence against (II) as a whole. The options available, 
given the ‘τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον’ requirement, are that either God 
intelligizes (I) God himself, or (II) something other than God, like the 
Good,40 or even the Good and some other thing(s), which are better than 
God and equally as divine and honourable as the Good. What it cannot mean, 
contra Beere,41 is that the object of God’s νόησις is (III) God and all of the 
other unmoved movers, who are all equally honourable and divine, because, 
the way the dichotomy is set up, God cannot think both himself and other 
things that are ‘co-honourable’ and ‘co-divine.’ 
I did not here differentiate the case of ‘God intellects the Good, which is 
more divine than God’ into (II.i), and the case of ‘God intellects the Good 
and other things, none of which are God, but all of which are equally more 
honourable and divine than God’ into (II.ii) because I think that 1074b26-27, 
which definitively precludes (II.ii), still preserves the possibility of a 
multiplicity of objects if they are intelligized simultaneously, as a set. What 
we see in this passage are two arguments against the (II.ii) idea that God 
intelligizes ‘first this and then that.’42 First, Aristotle puts pressure on the 
possibility that there could be multiple things which are all ‘co-divine’ and 
‘co-honourable’ by suggesting that God cannot change his νοητόν because 
change is for the worse. The second argument (1074b27), definitively 
eliminates (II.ii) by claiming that any change amongst the objects of God’s 
thought would unacceptably be a ‘motion [κίνησις].’ This imports the 
‘immutability’ idea from the earlier chapters of Metaphysics Λ (Λ.1, 
                                          
39 Perhaps suspiciously, Aristotle uses the term ‘διανοεῖσθαι’ here – a term which 
Burnyeat (2008), 29, argues against ‘collapsing up’ into νοῦς, and contends to 
belong only to the hylomorphic man and not to God (cf. Brunschwig (2000), 283 
n.32). I, however, think that it is likely that this is just a slippage point here, as the 
context (i.e. the repeated mentions of substancehood) still suggests God as the 
subject and neither Burnyeat nor Brunschwig gives a satisfying account of why 
man would appear at this particular point. 
40 Brunschwig (2000), 284. 
41 Beere (2010), 14 n.25. 
42 Cf. Brunschwig (2000), 285. 
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1069a33-1069b2; Λ.6, 1071b3-5; Λ.7, 1072a25, 26-7, 1072b7, 1073a4)43 and 
suggests that God’s perfection is such that he cannot be subject to κίνησις as 
in (II.ii). 
Further, if we admit God cannot change, we can seriously damage the 
possibility of (II) as a whole. In DC II.12, 292a22-292b15, Aristotle suggests 
that what is in the best condition does not move, while those things which 
most closely approximate it – like the Primary Heaven – move with few 
movements to attain the Good, and so on, until we get to those things that are 
incapable of attaining the Good, and instead strive for its imitation, and, 
finally, arrive at the Earth which, being so far away, no longer even attempts 
to move to attain this.44 On this view, we would have to believe that God 
was as far away removed from the Good as the Earth if he does not move but 
the object of his νόησις is some unchanging object (or simultaneous set of 
objects) other than itself (as in II.i). This unacceptable conclusion heavily 
supports accepting (I). Still, Aristotle does not here explicitly state that God 
is the object of his own νόησις, indicating that the aporia still remains open.  
 
 
3 
 
Now we can approach the interrelated solution passage (1074b28-35) for 
the first pair of aporiae.45 Let us start with the solution to the first aporia. 
Recall that the two remaining viable solutions are: (b) God actually thinks, 
                                          
43 Both Dumoulin (1998), 30-31, 338-339 and Brunschwig (2000), 301-304, 306 
contend that Λ.9 is an ‘archaic’ draft of Λ.7 and that it is supplanted by Aristotle’s 
‘philosophically mature’ view given in Λ.7. However, I – along with the majority 
of scholars – remain sceptical of this interpretation. It seems to me, rather, that 
there is a strong philosophical link between Λ.7 and Λ.9, as evidenced, for 
example, by the clear importation of philosophical concepts here. Brunschwig 
(2000), 285 admits that this importation occurs but thinks that, since the imported 
concept is also espoused in Λ.1 and Λ.6, the link is not sufficiently strong to 
suggest that Λ.9 is contemporaneous with Λ.7. However, if Λ.9 is linked to Λ.1 and 
Λ.6, as Brunschwig allows and, indeed, argues for, then – since both of these 
chapters seem to be from a similar period of philosophical development as Λ.7 (e.g. 
all of Λ.1, 6, and 7, unlike Λ.9, make use of the term ‘ἐνέργεια’ (cf. footnote 22)) – 
there seems to be prima facie evidence that Λ.9 and Λ.7 are similarly linked and, 
thus, products of the same period of Aristotle’s thought. The burden of proof, then, 
seems to shift more heavily towards Dumoulin and Brunschwig’s interpretation. 
44 Cf. Menn (2012), 449-450. 
45 Cf. Beere (2010), 8-9. 
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but is determined to do so by something else – i.e. is a νοῦς unified with a 
νοητόν and caused to actually intelligize either by that νοητόν or something 
else other than itself – and (c) God actually thinks and is determined to do so 
by himself – i.e. God’s οὐσία is, itself, νόησις. The first argument here, from 
weariness (1074b28-29), is designed to attack (b). If the οὐσία of God is not 
νόησις, but δύναμις (νοῦς), Aristotle says that the continuity of its νοήσεως 
would be burdensome. This is an unacceptable consequence for God, who is 
supposed to intelligize eternally, 46  because if an eternal actuality were 
burdensome, its capacity for action would ‘wear out’ and the actuality would 
cease (Met. Θ.8, 1050b26-7).47  
A further argument (1074b29-33) is also produced against (b)48 (contra 
Kosman, who thinks this argument is against (c)).49 The conclusion of this 
argument is that, if God is essentially a δύναμις, a νοῦς, then something 
would be ‘more honourable [τὸ τιμιώτερον]’ than it, namely its νοητόν. This 
argument is explained by the fact that, for a God that is essentially (b) – a 
faculty – its actualization will belong to it even if it intelligizes ‘the worst [τὸ 
χείριστον]’ things. Thus, because this is clearly to be avoided, the actual 
intelligizing will not be the best. Therefore, if God is essentially a faculty – 
even if it is currently intelligizing the most divine and honourable thing(s) – 
it would only be doing so contingently,50 which would preclude it from being 
intrinsically honourable for intelligizing, as God is explicitly required to be at 
1074b20-21.51  
Therefore, God’s οὐσία must essentially be (c) – pure νόησις. God’s 
substancehood must not be forgotten here, for it is the key to properly 
                                          
46 Met. Λ.6, 1071b20-21; Λ.7, 1072a25, 1072b24-30, 1075a4. Brunschwig and Dumoulin 
are both silent on the fact that this argument in Λ.9 is dependent on God’s eternal 
intelligizing – a point raised only in Λ.6 and 7 and not explicitly states in Λ.9 – 
which, again, suggests philosophical continuity between the chapters and tells 
against their idea that Λ.9 is an early, obsolete draft of Λ.7. 
47 Cf. Beere (2010), 19; Reeve (2016), 535 n.1384. 
48 Cf. Norman (1969), 70; De Filippo (1995), 556-557; Brunschwig (2000), 286; 
Beare (2010), 19. 
49 Kosman (200), 316. 
50 Cf. Norman (1969), 70. 
51 Brunschwig (2000), 286 does not draw a difference between the cases of 1074b20-
21 and 1074b29-33 but, rather, suggests that the 1074b20-21 case is also limited to 
the (b)-God conception. Yet, this would mean that there would be no explicit 
reason why an essentially potential God who did always intelligize the most divine 
thing would not have a νόησις that was the best thing. Insofar as our account is 
able to explain this, then, it has an advantage over that given by Brunschwig. 
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understanding the second part (1074b34-35) of Aristotle’s two-part claim at 
1074b33-35. Aristotle says here that God ‘is the most-powerful thing [ἐστὶ τὸ 
κράτιστον]’ and, famously, that God ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. I want 
to make two points here. Firstly, with the claim of ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις, 
Aristotle explicitly adopts (c) as his solution to the first aporia: God must 
essentially – substantially – be νόησις. I am, therefore, reading, with Beere52 
and De Filippo,53 the genitive νοήσεως as subjective rather than objective. 
Aristotle affirms that the νόησις is the νόησις of something that is essentially 
νόησις as opposed to the νόησις of a mere νοῦς. If we, instead, took νοήσεως 
to be an objective genitive, so that God’s νόησις was just being said to be of 
some unspecified νόησις, we would not only be repeating –in a weaker way – 
the first part of the two-part claim, namely, that God ‘intelligizes himself 
[αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ],’ but we would also never explicitly solve the first aporia by 
affirming that God’s οὐσία was νόησις. Secondly, the ‘τὸ κράτιστον’ 
wording is not, contra Brunschwig, 54  merely a Syllogistic-Proof-style 
argument for God intelligizing himself, but, rather, it also affirms the 
ontological independence of God, because God – understood as (c) – is not 
dependent on either an external object or an internal capacity to be fully 
actualized.55  
 
1)  
Let us now work through and solve the second aporia. Recall that the two 
still-viable options for the object of God’s νόησις are either (I) God himself, 
or (II.i) some unchanging object (or simultaneous set of objects) other than 
God which is (are) nevertheless (co-)divine and (co-)honourable to some 
degree higher than God.  
The first argument (1074b28-29) of this Section implicitly suggests that the 
burdensomeness would only occur if the νόητον was something distinct from 
God, such that it would be unacceptably laborious to continually actualize an 
object that was not essentially identical to God.56 This occurs because, if 
God, understood as a νοῦς, were actually identical with, and actually 
intelligizing, a νοητόν, this νοητόν could not be essentially the same as God 
because, if it were, it, too, would be essentially a δύναμις and, there would be 
                                          
52 Beere (2010), 18-19. 
53 De Filippo (1995), 556-557. 
54 Brunschwig (2000), 288. 
55 De Filippo (1995), 558-559 and Menn (2012), 447, both recognize the significance 
of God’s ontological priority. 
56 Brunschwig (2000), 286 briefly suggests this reading but does not fully develop it. 
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no actual νόησις, but only the already-rejected case of potential νόησις.  
A further argument is also advanced against (II.i): If God is conceived of 
as a faculty – as in (b) – then the value of his νόησις is determined by his 
νοητόν (as explained above). And, if his νοητόν is such that it permits him (at 
least logically) to intelligize worse things, i.e. if there is no essential unity 
necessitating that he intelligizes the most divine and honourable thing(s), 
then the νοητόν seems to lose some of its value. In other words, the best 
νοητόν is that which does not permit God to intelligize anything else worse 
than himself (1074b31-33). However, this requisite necessity condition only 
comes with (I). Thus, Aristotle definitively rejects (II.i) as a possibility for 
the νοητόν of God’s νόησις. 
It is important here to note how Kosman’s confusion with respect to the 
limit of the second argument at 1074b29-33 57  leads to the illicit non-
restriction of νοητά such that, as Kosman concludes, God can think all 
things.58 Kosman, not restricting this argument to (b), thinks that the upshot 
is that, if the divinity of the νοητά were to be considered, then, in any case, 
the divinity of νόησις would be unacceptably jeopardized. He therefore 
concludes that God’s νόησις must be best independent of whatever it 
intelligizes. In fact, however, the force of the argument goes the other way:59 
because God’s νόησις is best, it must think what both is best absolutely and 
what allows God to be best, in the way explained above. Thus, God must 
have only himself as his νοητόν. 
We can now mention two things about 1074b33-34. First, this passage can 
– though it need not – be seen as an expression of the Syllogistic Proof.60 
Secondly, we can take this ‘self-intelligizing’ to be a clear expression of 
Aristotle’s solution to the second aporia, by settling on (I), i.e. that the 
νοητόν of God’s νόησις is God himself.  
 
2)  
Now that we have reached the conclusion of our first pair of aporiae and 
have determined that God’s οὐσία is νόησις (c), and that he is also the νοητόν 
of his νόησις (I), it is important to explain exactly what this does not, and 
what it does, entail. Most significantly, it does not entail ‘the self-thinking of 
νοῦς qua νοῦς,’ i.e. an intelligizing of the act of (reflexive self-) intelligizing 
                                          
57 Kosman (2000), 317. 
58 Kosman (2000), 321, 323. 
59 As Beere (2010), 16-17, 17 n.29 notices. 
60 Cf. Brunschwig (2000), 288; Menn (2012), 442-444; Ross (1995), 114. 
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– in the way that De Filippo61 and Norman62 caricature the ‘Narcissus-God’ 
position – because we have determined that God is not a νοῦς but is, 
essentially, a pure νόησις. 
We must, however, be careful here. It is imperative that νόησις is not de-
substantialized to a mere ‘act’ – God’s substancehood, as enumerated in 
Section I, must be preserved. This, however, is made complicated by the fact 
that, in addition to being essentially νόησις, God is also simple. The solution, 
I believe, is to bear down on Aristotle’s claim that there cannot be floating 
properties ungrounded by a substance (GC I.3, 317b5-12; II.10, 337a29; Phys. 
I.2, 185a31-32; I.4, 188a5-8). Aristotle nowhere makes an exception to this 
rule and, further, it does not seem that doing so – by claiming that something 
whose οὐσία is an actuality does not require its activity to be grounded, 
because its essence just is the activity – is coherent. Aristotle, as is clear from 
the early chapters of the Categories (especially 2, 1a29-1b2; 4; 5, 2a11-17), 
believes that substances and activities operate on different ontological levels: 
activities are said in and of a subject, and substances are subjects. Thus, even 
if the οὐσία is an activity, there must be a logical distinction permitting the 
substance and the activity to be – while actually and essentially unified – 
logically different in being. Therefore, God remains simple and his οὐσία is 
still able to logically ground his essential activity of νόησις – he is, thus, a 
self-contemplating Narcissus-God.  
This view of God also helps answer Beere’s question of how God’s νόησις 
can have a ‘cognitive content’ if it is no longer understood in the ‘naturalistic’ 
way of a capacity (νοῦς) being actualized by a νοητόν, but, rather, as the 
νόησις of essential νόησις.63 By appealing to the logical distinction that we 
have advanced here between the οὐσία and the act, we can say that God’s 
intellection avoids vacuity by being the intellection of his own essence. Kahn 
is, then, correct to note that an individual act of νόησις is not itself a νοητά, 
so it cannot be the object of God’s intelligizing.64 Rather, God’s own οὐσία 
is what serves as the νοητόν of his νόησις, such that it is of the concept of 
eternal, simple, purely actual, and absolutely unmoved νόησις.  
What we get, then, is a radically-unified, self-contemplating Narcissus-
God, where his νόησις is of himself as a substantial, purely actual, self, and 
his eternally-actual νόησις is essentially unified metaphysically with his 
οὺσία, only differing from it logically, thereby preserving his simplicity. 
                                          
61 De Filippo (1995), 557-558, cf. 544. 
62 Norman (1969), 71-72. 
63 Beere (2010), 10. 
64 Kahn (1992), 375. 
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Thus, as we have explained above, God is related to himself in an extremely 
close way – so close that this relationship cannot be duplicated by any other 
νοητά, for no other νοητά will be essentially identical with his actuality.  
 
 
4 
 
With the object of God’s νόησις posited as his own οὐσία, we now are 
faced with several aporiae concerning how to work this out. The next pair of 
aporiae also have an intertwined solution (overlapping at 1075a3-5), and help 
express just what we mean when we say that God intelligizes himself. 
Let us start with the third aporia, which asks ‘Is it possible for God to be 
his own νοητόν directly?’ (1074b35-36) and is concerned with the ‘πάρεργον’ 
problem.65 This problem begins with an inference from how, for several 
(human) cognitive activities, it seems that they are always of something else 
and only ‘by-the-way [ἐν παρέργῳ]’ of themselves – i.e. perception is not of 
perception principally, though we do ‘perceive that we perceive’ (DA III.2, 
425b12) – in an attempt to motivate a similar worry for the νόησις of God. 
However, we should notice that νόησις is not included in this list, 66 
foreshadowing a dis-analogy in the cases. 
And this is exactly what we find. From 1074b38-1075a3, Aristotle presents 
the cases of identity between ‘the thing [τὸ πρᾶγμα]’ ‘without matter [ἄνευ 
ὕλης]’ and the ‘substance and the essence [οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι]’ for the 
productive sciences, and between τὸ πρᾶγμα and the λόγος and νόησις for the 
theoretical sciences. Thus, in these cases, there is clearly a path to some-level 
of identity: while a productive science is not fully identical to the intelligizing 
human νοῦς because of its hylomorphic nature (clearly ‘carpentry’ cannot be 
identical to my νοῦς because my νοῦς cannot physically become a hammer or 
other such tools), if we abstract the matter away, there is identity. Similarly, 
for (non-hylomorphic) theoretical sciences, there is actual identity between 
the science and my νόησις, but not substance-to-substance identity (I, as a 
substance, do not become identical to this science, only one of my faculties, 
νοῦς, does) because man is limited by being, himself, a hylomorph. 67 
However, for God – as explained in 1075a3-5 – it seems that there is, finally, 
full substantial identity: Aristotle asserts there, for matterless things, 
                                          
65 Brunschwig (2000), 291-292. 
66 Cf. De Filippo (1995), 561. 
67 Cf. De Filippo (1995), 548. 
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‘intelligizing will be one with what is intelligized [ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ 
μία].’ As Kosman suggests, for God there is an erasure between remote and 
immediate object: God’s οὐσία, being νόησις, is fully identical to his 
νοητόν.68  
Further, God’s οὐσία is identical to his νοητόν in a special sense – more 
closely than if he were just intelligizing some non-hylomorphic theoretical 
science – because, instead of just intelligizing one among many νοητά, God 
essentially intelligizes his own οὐσία. He is a radically-unified Narcissus-
God, metaphysically simple with only a logical distinction between his 
eternal activity of νόησις and his οὐσία.  
 
1) 
The fourth aporia, significantly, explicitly introduces the simplicity 
requirement to Λ.9. The question is, ‘In respect of τὸ νοεῖν or τὸ νοεῖσθαι 
does the good belong to God?’ (1074b36-38). The non-identity of ‘the being 
[τὸ εἶναι]’ of the νοήσει and the νοουμένῳ is emphasized here, and this 
seems to be the key for understanding the aporetic solution. This solution, 
given at 1075a3-5,69 is just that, for things without matter, what is intelligized 
and the intellect will be the same thing, and ‘intelligizing will be one with 
what is intelligized [ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία].’ Beere rightly takes this to 
be a claim about God’s simplicity. However, he goes too far by suggesting 
that this text lays down the framework to deny that intelligizing is ‘a subject-
object relation between a thing and itself,’ to affirm that God’s νόησις is not 
‘self-reflection or a reflexive relation’ and to claim that there is ‘no basis for 
distinguishing between the νοῦς and its activity (ἐνέργεια), νόησις.’70  
This position threatens to entirely de-substantialize God. As explained 
above, one can distinguish the substance and its activity, even if the 
substance is that activity, by logically distinguishing the ground from the 
action. Rather than viewing the solution to the aporia, as Beere does, in such 
a way that denies that the substance and the act are different even in being, I 
think that Aristotle’s response shows that, while they are different in being, 
they are unified, and, thus, essentially simple in actuality. So, while God’s 
substance is to act, the ‘good’ belongs to it, as the act does, due to its 
grounding substancehood. 
 
                                          
68 Kosman (2000), 321. 
69 Contra Brunschwig (2000), 276, 292, who thinks that this aporia is never answered. 
70 Beere (2010), 28-30. 
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The final aporia asks ‘Can God himself be composite (as τὸ νοούμενον)?’ 
(1075a5-6). If – with Beere71, Brunschwig,72 De Filippo,73 and Kosman74 – 
we, again, cautiously assume that Aristotle accepts the premises of this aporia, 
there appear to be three things to say about Aristotle’s solution (1075a6-10). 
First, it seems clear that any sort of composite νοούμενον – which appears to 
be an attempt to import, from (II.i) into (I), the possibility of simultaneously 
intelligizing of a complex object – is prohibited. There may not be a 
simultaneous intelligizing of actually separable objects even if they all 
(somehow) were God. As Menn notes,75 any such complexity would illicitly 
result in potentiality, because what is complex is potentially divisible (Met. 
N.2, 1088b14-28; Z.13, 1039a3-14), Thus, God cannot, contra Lear76 and 
Burnyeat,77 be – or have, as the object of his νόησις – a unified system of all 
intelligible essences. 
Secondly, while there is no complex whole that is potentially divisible in 
the case of God, this does not mean that there are no logical aspects 
whatsoever (contra Beere).78  God's simplicity, as explained above, still 
involves the logical aspects of substance and act, as is required to avoid 
collapsing down to a de-substantiated floating activity. 
Lastly, contra Brunschwig,79 it is not the case that a human intellect 
intelligizing indivisibles and the divine intellection would ‘bring out a 
complete similarity.’ God should not be understood as a perfected version of 
us, intelligizing more perfectly and for a longer period of time.80 Aristotle is 
extremely critical of the poets for making the gods eternal men, and of Plato 
for making the Forms eternal sensibles (Met. Β.2, 997b5-12). It seems that he 
would be equally critical of himself if he made God an eternally intelligizing 
human. Instead, God stands to his νοητόν, i.e. himself, in a way that is unlike 
how he could stand to any other νοητά, because his essential unity with 
                                          
71 Beere (2010), 30. 
72 Brunschwig (2000), 298-301. 
73 De Filippo (1995), 562. 
74 Kosman (2000), 322. 
75 Menn (2012), 446-447, 447 n.35. 
76 Lear (1988), 295. 
77 Burnyeat (2008), 40-43, 40 n.53.  
78 Beere (2010), 30. 
79 Brunschwig (2000), 299-301. 
80 Contra Norman (1969), 67-8. 
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himself eliminates the need for a remote object, and this produces the 
objective self-consciousness of his essence.81 We, thus, know exactly what 
the content of his νοητόν is, contra De Filippo.82 Further, contra Burnyeat,83 
we can express God’s essence in a single sentence, namely: the νοητόν of 
God’s νόησις is his own, purely actual οὐσία, the concept of an eternal, 
simple, purely actual, and absolutely unmoved νόησις. 
It should be clear now where my theory stands. God is a self-contemplator, 
in the style of the traditional Narcissus-argument, but he is radically-unified 
and not just empty thought. Further, he is a substance, and (metaphysically) 
simple, such that, being the best thing, he eternally intelligizes himself alone, 
thereby achieving the highest metaphysical good. 
 
  
                                          
81 Kosman (2000), 321, 323. 
82 De Filippo (1995), 545, 558-560. 
83 Burnyeat (2008), 25-26. 
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[Abstract] 
 
 
The Object of Aristotle’s God’s Νόησις in 
Metaphysics Λ.9 
 
 
Sean M. Costello 
 
 
In this paper I attempt to discover the object of Aristotle’s God’s νόησις in 
Metαphysics Λ.9. In Section I, I catalogue existing interpretations and 
mention the two key concepts of (i) God’s substancehood and (ii) his 
metaphysical simplicity. In Section II, I explore the first two aporiae of Λ.9 – 
namely (1) what God’s οὐσία is and (2) what God intelligizes. In Section III, 
I show how Aristotle solves these aporiae by contending that God’s οὐσία is 
actually intelligizing, and being determined to do so by himself, and that the 
object of his νόησις is himself, such that he intelligizes his own οὐσία, and I 
explain what this means. In Section IV, I present the second pair of aporiae in 
Λ.9 and show how, by solving these, Aristotle clarifies the position arrived at 
in Section III. Lastly, in Section V, I present the final aporia and its solution, 
and conclude that Aristotle’s God is a radically-unified Narcissus-God who 
intelligizes his own οὐσία and who has, above all, fulfilled the Delphic 
principle: Γνῶθι Σεαυτόν. 
 
[Key words]: Aristotelian theology, pure intellect, self-intelligizing, divine 
simplicity, divine substancehood, Metaphysics Λ.9. 
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